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BETTING THE RANCHERIA: 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS AS 
BARGAINING CHIPS UNDER THE INDIAN 
GAMING REGULATORY ACT 
Matthew Murphy* 
Abstract: In 2005, the State of California and the Big Lagoon Rancheria 
American Indian Tribe reached an agreement whereby the tribe agreed 
to forego development plans for a casino on environmentally sensitive 
lands in exchange for the right to build a casino in Barstow, California. In 
January 2008, the Department of the Interior denied the Rancheria’s 
land-into-trust application for land in Barstow based on the Department’s 
newly issued “commutable distance” memorandum. This denial repre-
sents a missed opportunity to allow California and the tribe to cooperate 
in fashioning a workable tribal-state compact. The Department should 
abandon the guidance memorandum and allow tribes to pursue off-
reservation gaming in appropriate instances where the proposed devel-
opment enjoys political support at the local level. In exchange, states 
should be afforded greater deference under the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act to achieve some level of regulatory control to address the off-
reservation impacts of casino development. 
Introduction 
 The Big Lagoon in Northern California—one of the state’s few 
remaining naturally functioning coastal lagoons—borders three state 
parks and supports diverse populations of animals and plants.1 The Big 
Lagoon Rancheria American Indian Tribe occupies lands adjacent to 
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1 Tribal-State Compact between the State of California and the Big Lagoon Rancheria 1 
(2005), available at http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/Press/Big_Lagoon_Rancheria_Compact.pdf 
[hereinafter Big Lagoon Compact]; Frank D. Russo, Agua Caliente Puts Governor and Legisla-
ture in Hot Water over Casino Compact While Big Lagoon Tribe Is Left Out in the Cold, California 
Progress Report, Aug. 16, 2006, http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2006/08/agua_ 
caliente_p.html. 
172 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:171 
this “environmentally sensitive” ecosystem.2 The state resisted tribal at-
tempts to build a casino on the lagoon, arguing that the proposed ca-
sino would have dire consequences on the lagoon ecosystem.3 
 In 2005, the tribe and state reached a compromise where the 
tribe agreed to waive all gaming rights on its ancestral lands in ex-
change for the right to construct a casino over 500 miles away in Bar-
stow, California (the “Barstow proposal”).4 The Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act (IGRA) generally prohibits off-reservation gaming except 
in limited circumstances.5 The tribe applied under IGRA’s “two-part 
determination” exception, which permits gaming on newly acquired 
lands when the proposed off-reservation gaming establishment would 
be “in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members and would 
not be detrimental to the surrounding community.”6 
 In January 2008, the Department of the Interior effectively killed 
the proposal when it denied the tribe’s trust application.7 It based this 
denial on its own guidance memorandum—released the same day it 
denied the Barstow proposal—in which the Department intended to 
clarify when it would apply the two-part determination exception to 
take off-reservation lands into trust for gaming purposes.8 
                                                                                                                      
2 Joshua L. Sohn, Comment, The Double-Edged Sword of Indian Gaming, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 
139, 152 (2006) (citing California Coastal Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30240(a) (West 
1996)). 
3 Id. 
4 Id.; see Jason Smith, Federal Government Rejects Tribes’ Casino Plans, Desert Dispatch 
(Barstow, CA), Jan. 8, 2008, at A1. Press Release, Office of the Governor for the State of 
California, Governor Schwarzenegger Announces Indian Gaming Agreements (Sept. 9, 
2005), http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/1438/ [hereinafter Governor’s Press 
Release]. 
5 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
6 Id.; see, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Indian Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands, 47 Washburn L.J. 
675, 688–89 (2008). IGRA does not authorize the Secretary to take land into trust; it cre-
ates a separate requirement that a tribe must meet in addition to the requirements under 
the Indian Reorganization Act. See, e.g., Kathryn R.L. Rand, Alan P. Meister & Stephen 
Andrew Light, Questionable Federal “Guidance” on Off-Reservation Indian Gaming: Legal and 
Economic Issues, 12 Gaming L. Rev. & Econ. 194, 195–96 (2008). 
7 See Letter from Carl J. Artman, Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Inte-
rior, to the Honorable Virgil Moorehead, Chairman, Big Lagoon Rancheria 4 ( Jan. 3, 
2008), available at http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia/biglagoon010408.pdf [hereinafter 
Artman Letter]. 
8 Memorandum from Carl Artman, Assistant Sec’y of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the In-
terior, to Bureau of Indian Affairs Reg’l Dirs. and the Office of Indian Gaming ( Jan. 3, 2008), 
available at http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia/artman010308.pdf [hereinafter Guidance 
Memorandum]; see Jenson, supra note 6, at 694–95; Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 
198. 
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 The rise and fall of the Barstow proposal highlights the complex 
tension among federal, tribal, state, and local interests brought about 
by the rise in American Indian casino gambling.9 Although some states 
welcome the economic boost that Indian gaming provides, there has 
also been a considerable backlash to its development.10 States over-
whelmingly attempt to mitigate this backlash by demanding large reve-
nue-sharing agreements in the tribal-state compacting process.11 The 
Barstow proposal highlights a move beyond this pecuniary tunnel vi-
sion towards a creative compact process that better addresses the myr-
iad concerns often associated with casino projects.12 This new model of 
compact negotiations contemplates appropriate off-reservation devel-
opment in exchange for an increased role for state environmental 
regulatory control.13 
 This Note proposes that the Barstow proposal should serve as a 
model for future tribal-state compacts. Part I frames the discussion with 
a brief history of the Barstow proposal. Part II examines the evolution 
of Indian gaming. Part III examines environmental regulatory control 
in the context of Indian lands. Part IV discusses the compacting proc-
ess. Part V concludes that the Department’s guidance memorandum 
unduly restricts the ability of states and tribes to utilize off-reservation 
gaming to alleviate economic, environmental, and social concerns. To 
wit, states should enjoy a broad interpretation of the compacting provi-
sions permitted under IGRA to achieve greater environmental regula-
tory control. In exchange, tribes should enjoy greater leeway in devel-
oping off-reservation gaming operations when the local municipality 
supports the project and the site offers environmental and social ad-
vantages over on-reservation development. This compacting regime 
represents the best opportunity for states to negotiate with tribes in or-
der to alleviate citizen concerns, mitigate environmental impacts, and 
respect tribal sovereignty in the casino development process. 
                                                                                                                      
9 See, e.g., Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State 
Courts Constrain Tribal Influence over Indian Gaming, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 971, 982 (2007) (dis-
cussing the increasing influence of state legislatures over Indian gaming). 
10 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 39, 
40 (2007); see discussion infra Part II.E. 
11 See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 69. Although IGRA prohibits states from taxing Indian 
casinos, courts and the Secretary of the Interior generally permit revenue-sharing schemes 
so long as the tribe receives separate consideration—often an exclusive license that pro-
hibits non-Indian gaming competition. Rand, supra note 9, at 985–86. 
12 See Governor’s Press Release, supra note 4 (“These agreements are a creative solu-
tion for avoiding the construction of a casino on California’s coast and alongside a State 
ecological preserve, while respecting the tribes’ federal right to engage in gaming.”). 
13 Id. 
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I. The Big Lagoon Rancheria’s Barstow Proposal 
 The California Department of Fish and Game manages an eco-
logical preserve around the Big Lagoon— “an environmentally sensitive 
habitat area within the meaning of the California Coastal Act.”14 This 
fragile coastal ecosystem supports three species listed under the Federal 
Endangered Species Act.15 Although the California Coastal Commis-
sion severely limited development around the lagoon on non-tribal 
lands, the tribe planned to build a casino on its land.16 Environmental-
ists and state officials recognized the environmental concerns associ-
ated with the tribe’s on-reservation casino development proposal.17 
California, intent on preserving the Big Lagoon ecosystem, objected to 
any casino that would have violated the California Coastal Commis-
sion’s land-use restrictions.18 
 The 2005 compromise between the tribe and the state had the 
potential to resolve the impasse because the tribe agreed to forego 
development at the lagoon and instead construct a casino in Bar-
stow.19 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger lauded the agreement, be-
lieving the state had averted an environmental crisis, and had guaran-
teed much-needed economic stimulus for the tribe and the city.20 The 
city of Barstow overwhelmingly supported the proposal.21 State envi-
ronmental agencies—happy to avoid threats to water quality, endan-
gered species, and scenery at the Big Lagoon—also joined in sup-
                                                                                                                      
14 Big Lagoon Compact, supra note 1, at 1; Sohn, supra note 2, at 152 n.112. 
15 Big Lagoon Compact, supra note 1, at 1. 
16 See Sohn, supra note 2, at 152 (citing California Coastal Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code 
§ 30240(a) (West 1996) (“Environmentally sensitive habitat areas shall be protected against 
any significant disruption of habitat values, and only uses dependent on those resources 
shall be allowed within those areas.”)). 
17 Id.; Russo, supra note 1 (“[T]he Big Lagoon Rancheria is . . . home to old-growth 
redwoods, bald eagles, black bears, Roosevelt elk, Coho salmon, peregrine falcons, and 
other rare plant and animal species.”). 
18 Sohn, supra note 2, at 152; see Big Lagoon Compact, supra note1, at 1. Activities ex-
clusively within and directly affecting a coastal zone are subject to state review under the 
Coastal Zone Management Act. See Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 330 
(1984). 
19 Sohn, supra note 2, at 152; Governor’s Press Release, supra note 4. 
20 See Governor’s Press Release, supra note 4. The governor hailed the compact as a 
“creative solution for avoiding the construction of a casino on California’s coast and along-
side a State ecological preserve, while respecting the tribes’ federal right to engage in gam-
ing.” Id. 
21 Id. (noting the “City of Barstow’s active efforts to bring to that city the economic ac-
tivity associated with an Indian gaming facility”). 
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port.22 Others echoed that the deal represented a “legitimate example 
of appropriately relocating a casino out of environmentally-sensitive 
lands and one that uph[eld] the state’s responsibility to protect . . . 
invaluable natural resources.”23 The California Legislature, however, 
was less receptive to the proposal, and failed to endorse it in 2007.24 
Although lawmakers pointed to the large distance between the reser-
vation and the city of Barstow as the reason for their reluctance, critics 
of the legislature felt that the political clout of powerful southern 
California gaming tribes opposed to any incursion into their market 
fueled legislative antipathy.25 
 On January 4, 2008, the Department of the Interior declined to take 
the Barstow land into trust based on a new “commutable distance” guid-
ance memorandum issued the same day.26 In a letter to the tribe, Assis-
tant Secretary for Indian Affairs Carl Artman stated that the distance be-
tween the proposed acquisition and the reservation would not allow 
tribal members to remain on the reservation and enjoy any “meaningful 
employment benefits” at a facility located 550 miles away from the reser-
vation.27 Tribal members expressed dismay at this decision, complaining 
that federal officials believed “tribal members would be better off poor 
and unemployed and living on the reservation rather than living off the 
reservation near the casino with [jobs].”28 Following this denial, the tribe 
                                                                                                                      
22 John Driscoll, Feds Kill Barstow Casino Plan; Rancheria Unswayed on Gaming Facility at 
Big Lagoon, Times-Standard (Eureka, CA), Jan. 9, 2008, at A1. 
23 Russo, supra note 1. 
24 John Myers, Feds Reject Barstow Casino Plan, Capital Notes, Jan. 7, 2008, http:// 
blogs.kqed.org/capitalnotes/2008/01/07/feds-reject-barstow-casino-plan/. See Jason Smith, 
Some Residents Not Surprised By Casino Setback, Desert Dispatch (Barstow, CA), Jan. 8, 2008, at 
A1. In California, Indian gaming compacts must be negotiated by the governor and then 
ratified by the legislature. Cal. Const. art. 4, § 19. 
25 Myers, supra note 24. Indeed, even the governor’s support for the proposal cooled 
after the Agua Caliente tribe voiced opposition to the Barstow proposal. Russo, supra note 
1. The Agua Caliente claimed that the Barstow casino would compete with the their exist-
ing casino and embolden union organizers. Id. In an effort to keep the compact alive, 
however, the governor did extend the time by which the compact must take effect in order 
to give the federal government more time to take the land into trust. Press Release, Office 
of the Governor for the State of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger Announces Extension for 
Big Lagoon and Los Coyotes Gaming Compacts (May 31, 2007), http://gov. 
ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/6514/. 
26 See discussion infra Part IV. 
27 Artman Letter, supra note 7, at 3. 
28 Indianz.com, BIA Starts New Year with Off-Reservation Gaming Policy, http://www. 
indianz.com/News/2008/006500.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2009) (quoting Francine Kupsch, 
Spokesperson for the Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla and Cupeño Indians in California). 
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began to resurrect its efforts to construct a casino at Big Lagoon—an 
idea opposed by environmental groups and the governor.29 
II. Evolution of the Indian American Gaming Industry 
A. Historical Context: Tribal Sovereign Power and Federal Preemption 
 The purpose of Indian reservations is to provide a “homeland for 
the survival and growth of the Indians and their way of life.”30 Indians 
on their reservations have the sovereign right “to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them.”31 This retention of tribal sovereign power con-
strains the power of the states to interact with Native American tribes.32 
Although the Supreme Court recognizes Indian tribes as sovereign na-
tions, it does not accord the tribes the “full attributes of sovereignty.”33 
As the Court in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville noted, 
“[t]ribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the 
Federal Government, not the States.”34 The Constitution vests Congress 
with plenary power over Indian affairs.35 Therefore, tribes retain sover-
                                                                                                                      
29 Jessie Faulkner, Big Lagoon Takes Steps to Expand Tribal Lands, Times-Standard 
(Eureka, CA), Feb. 5, 2008, at A3, available at http://www.times-standard.com/local/ 
ci_8172078. Prior to the Secretary’s decision, the Rancheria asked the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs to take a five-acre parcel into trust near the reservation for housing. Id. Fearing casino 
development on this new trust land, the California Coastal Commission sought development 
restrictions. Id. After the Secretary denied the Barstow Proposal, the Rancheria chairman 
objected to any land-use restrictions, hinting that the tribe may pursue casino development 
on the land. Id. 
30 Confederated Colville Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 49 (9th Cir. 1981). “[T]he tribes 
remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government structure, culture, and source of 
sovereignty are in many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the federal and 
state governments.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978). 
31 Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 121 n.5 (2005) (citing 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)). 
32 See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987). Congress’s plenary 
power over Indian affairs means “Indian tribes fall under nearly exclusive federal, rather 
than state, control.” American Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 
1096 (9th Cir. 2002). 
33 E.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 169 (1982) (quoting United 
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886)). 
34 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980); Stephanie A. Levin, Betting on the Land: Indian Gambling 
and Sovereignty, 8 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 125, 127 (1997). 
35 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Because Congress must act in a manner consistent with pro-
tecting Indian affairs, the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes 
is often characterized as a trust relationship, whereby the United States owes fiduciary 
duties to Indian tribes. Jason D. Kolkema, Comment, Federal Policy of Indian Gaming on 
Newly Acquired Lands and the Threat to State Sovereignty: Retaining Gubernatorial Authority Over 
the Federal Approval of Gaming on Off-Reservation Sites, 73 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 361, 366 
(1996). 
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eign power where it has not been: “(1) given up in a treaty; (2) divested 
by an act of Congress; or (3) divested by implication as a result of their 
status as, to use the term adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, ‘domes-
tic dependent nations.’”36 
 Although tribal sovereignty “is not subject to diminution by the 
States,”37 in 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280 to give California 
and a handful of other states “a broad grant of criminal jurisdiction 
and a limited grant of civil jurisdiction over tribes within their bor-
ders.”38 Public Law 280 restricted these grants of jurisdiction to causes 
of action in which Indians are a party; it did not, however, grant juris-
diction over the tribe itself.39 
 It is worth noting that since 1981 there has been a presumption 
that tribes cannot exert jurisdiction over non-Indians “beyond what is 
necessary to protect tribal self-government.”40 In Montana v. United 
States, the Supreme Court carved out two exceptions in which a tribe 
may exert sovereign control over non-Indians: regulating the activities 
of non-Indians who enter into consensual relationships with the tribes, 
and civil authority over conduct that “threatens or has some direct ef-
fect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe.”41 The consent exception has been construed nar-
rowly, where there must be a “tight nexus between the relationship and 
the regulation or tax at issue.”42 In Brendale v. Yakima, the court con-
strued the health and welfare exception narrowly, holding that the ef-
fect must be “demonstrably serious” to endanger the health and welfare 
of the tribe.43 
                                                                                                                      
36 Joyce L. Kiel, Wisconsin Legislator Briefing Book, at P-6 (2006), available at 
http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/publications/briefingbook/state_tribal.pdf; see 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(a) (2000) (tribal consent); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Thunder, 605 N.W.2d 
750, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (Congressional delegation). 
37 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998). 
38 Rand, supra note 9, at 975–76; see 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000). 
39 28 U.S.C. § 1360. The purpose of this law was to encourage states to assert limited 
jurisdiction over Indian lands. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold 
Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 887 (1986). 
40 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); see Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversi-
ties of Indian Law, 12 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 329, 348 (2008). 
41 Levy, supra note 40, at 349 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). 
42 Id. at 355 (citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001)). 
43 Brendale v. Yakima, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989); Levy, supra note 40, at 350. 
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B. Origins of American Indian Casino Gaming and California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians 
 Beginning in the late 1970s, several American Indian tribes 
opened small casino and bingo halls on reservations in an attempt to 
stimulate tribal economic development.44 The tribes reasoned that state 
criminal laws barring gambling did not apply on Indian land.45 Several 
of these bingo halls became highly profitable, so tribes began offering 
larger cash prizes.46 As their bingo halls expanded, tribes such as the 
Cabazon and Morongo Band of Mission Indians in California began to 
offer high-stakes bingo on their reservations.47 The state sued to stop 
the gaming, claiming that the operations violated state regulations lim-
iting jackpot amounts.48 California asserted that Public Law 280 
granted it the power to regulate American Indian bingo halls.49 
 In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the United States 
Supreme Court denied California’s attempts to regulate Indian casino 
gambling, holding that “[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted . . . if it in-
terferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in 
federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify 
the assertion of state authority.”50 Underlying the Court’s decision was 
a distinction between “criminal/prohibitory” and “civil/regulatory” 
laws.51 The Court applied this shorthand test to determine whether 
the gaming violated the state’s public policy.52 The Court concluded 
that California regulated gaming but did not prohibit it.53 This dis-
tinction proved crucial, as the Court ruled that Indian tribes could 
operate gaming facilities on Indian land without state regulatory in-
                                                                                                                      
44 See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 10, at 45; Kathryn L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the 
Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming, 5 Chap. L. Rev. 47, 50–51 (2002). 
45 See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 45; Rand, supra note 44, at 50–51. 
46 Levin, supra note 34, at 136; Rand, supra note 44, at 51. For its part, the federal gov-
ernment recognized that revenue from bingo enterprises could be used to promote Indian 
economic independence. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 45. 
47 Rand, supra note 44, at 51. 
48 See id. 
49 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987); see 
Fletcher, supra note 10, at 47. 
50 480 U.S. at 216 (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 
(1983)). 
51 Id. at 210; see Levin, supra note 34, at 127. 
52 Levin, supra note 34, at 127; Rand, supra note 9, at 976 (quoting Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 
209). 
53 Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211. “In light of the fact that California permits a substantial 
amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its 
state lottery, we must conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in 
general and bingo in particular.” Id. 
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terference, so long as the state regulated rather than prohibited gam-
ing.54 Cabazon therefore stands for the proposition that a state could 
prevent tribes from engaging in gambling development only by adopt-
ing a complete prohibition on all gambling.55 The Cabazon decision 
“gave tribes the green light to initiate their own gambling enterprises 
on their reservations—irrespective of state civil regulatory laws.”56 
C. Post-Cabazon Federal Regulation: IGRA and a Balance of Interests 
 Fearing that Cabazon meant unchecked and unregulated gam-
bling, states quickly lobbied Congress to enact federal legislation to 
regulate Indian casino development.57 Congress faced a balancing act 
in which states “sought to protect their sovereign interest in safe-
guarding the public health, safety and welfare” while tribes sought 
freedom to pursue economic development commensurate with their 
status as domestic dependent sovereigns.58 Congress responded by 
passing IGRA, which increased the states’ role in regulating American 
Indian gaming beyond what the Court contemplated in Cabazon.59 
IGRA divides Indian gaming operations into three categories.60 Class 
III gaming, which covers non-bingo casino activities, is permitted on 
Indian lands in states that permit “such gaming for any purpose by 
any person, organization, or entity . . . .”61 
 In enacting IGRA, Congress sought “to provide a statutory basis 
for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting 
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal gov-
                                                                                                                      
54 Id., at 210, 211 n.10; Levin, supra note 34, at 127; see Dewberry v. Kulongoski, 406 F. 
Supp. 2d 1136, 1140 (D. Or. 2005); Fletcher, supra note 10, at 48. 
55 See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 48; Levin, supra note 34, at 127; Amy L. Cox, Note, The 
New Buffalo: Tribal Gaming as a Means of Sustenance Under Attack, 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
863, 866 (1998). 
56 See Levin, supra note 34, at 127. 
57 Fletcher, supra note 10, at 50; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, How Con-
gress Can and Should “Fix” the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Recommendations for Law and 
Policy Reform, 13 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 396, 408 (2006). 
58 Memorandum from Michael Rossetti, Counselor to the Sec’y of Interior, et al., Dep’t 
of Interior 4 (2004) [hereinafter Indian Gaming Paper], available at http://www.indianz. 
com/docs/court/stcroix/paper022004.pdf. 
59 Rand, supra note 44, at 52. Congress sought to strike a balance between state and 
tribal authority, while ensuring that tribes could open and operate casinos “in accord with 
federal interests in tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” Rand & Light, supra 
note 57, at 408. 
60 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000). 
61 Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B). 
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ernments . . . .”62 Recognizing these fundamental principles, the Sen-
ate Committee Report stated: “Congress will not unilaterally impose 
or allow State jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of Indian 
gaming activities.”63 To assuage state concerns about lack of input, 
Congress required that the tribe and the state negotiate and enter 
into a tribal-state compact for each Class III gaming facility.64 By dele-
gating this negotiating power to the states, Congress provided the 
states a mechanism to regulate activities directly associated with gam-
ing.65 This delegation of authority made the legality of tribal gaming 
development dependent on state gaming policy and the tribal-state 
compacting process.66 
 Many tribes viewed IGRA as an incursion into tribal sovereign 
power.67 As a concession, Congress provided the tribes an enforce-
ment mechanism by allowing them to sue states in federal court if a 
state refused to negotiate in “good faith.”68 To determine whether a 
state has negotiated in good faith, the court may consider the “public 
interest and public safety, criminality and financial integrity, and ad-
verse economic impacts on existing gambling interests.”69 This good 
faith duty represented the necessary counterbalance to ensure that 
states opposed to American Indian casinos would not scuttle the ne-
gotiation process.70 
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. § 2702(1); see, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 10, at 51, Rand, Meister & Light, supra 
note 6, at 204. 
63 S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 5–6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075; Rand, 
supra note 9, at 978. 
64 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). 
65 See, e.g., Rand, supra note 9, at 977. 
66 See id. 
67 Levin, supra note 34, at 130. 
68 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii); Rand, supra note 9, at 977. 
69 Steven Andrew Light, Kathryn R.L. Rand & Alan P. Meister, Spreading the Wealth: In-
dian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D. L. Rev. 657, 664 (2004). 
70 See Rand, supra note 9, at 979; Chris Rausch, The Problem with Good Faith: The Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act a Decade After Seminole, 11 Gaming L. Rev. 423, 423–24 (2007). 
IGRA is seen by some as “an example of ‘cooperative federalism’ in that it seeks to balance 
competing sovereign interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian 
tribes, by giving each a role in the regulatory scheme.” Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 216 F. 
Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
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D. Upsetting the Balance of IGRA: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 
and the Rise of Revenue Sharing 
 In 1996, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that destroyed the 
balance struck by IGRA.71 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the 
Court held that Congress could not subject the states to suit in federal 
court for failing the “good faith” duty because the Eleventh Amend-
ment granted the states sovereign immunity protection.72 This deci-
sion came as a shock to the tribes because they lost the enforcement 
mechanism contemplated by Congress to compel states to negotiate 
in good faith.73 Consequently, this “right without a remedy” allowed 
states to dictate the terms of the compact beyond what Congress in-
tended.74 As a practical result, state politics now have “greater power” 
in the compacting process.75 Some critics of Seminole feel that “good 
faith may equate simply to the state’s posture toward Indian gaming: 
what the governor is willing to negotiate, the state legislature to ap-
prove, or the state courts to uphold.”76 
 After Seminole thwarted tribal bargaining power, some states 
adopted more aggressive negotiation strategies.77 For example, states 
have capitalized on this imbalance by requiring that tribes accept 
“revenue sharing” as a required compact term.78 IGRA explicitly pro-
hibits states from demanding taxation provisions in compact negotia-
tions—stating that a demand for a taxation provision is “evidence that 
the State has not negotiated in good faith.”79 Revenue sharing enables 
states to siphon off a cut of tribal profits but avoid the prohibition 
against taxation so long as they offer the tribe separate considera-
tion—often a grant of “substantial exclusivity” granting the tribe a 
monopoly against non-Indian competition in the local market.80 
                                                                                                                      
71 See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see, e.g., Fletcher, 
supra note 10, at 57; Rand, supra note 9, at 981. 
72 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72; Rand, supra note 9, at 981. 
73 Rand, supra note 9, at 981. 
74 Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 Wyo. L. Rev. 427, 441 
(2001); see Rausch, supra note 70, at 426 (discussing Pennsylvania’s efforts to include hunt-
ing rights and cigarette taxes as IGRA compact terms). 
75 Rand, supra note 9, at 981; Rausch, supra note 70, at 426 (noting that the “caselaw is 
rife with examples of conduct deemed to be not in bad faith”). 
76 Id. at 983. 
77 See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 58–59. 
78 See, e.g., id. at 57–59; Rausch, supra note 70, at 426–27 (noting that courts have gen-
erally allowed revenue sharing compact provisions). 
79 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(II) (2000). 
80 See Rand, supra note 9, at 985–86 & n.74; Blake A. Watson, Indian Gambling in Ohio: 
What Are the Odds?, 32 Cap. U. L. Rev. 237, 308–09 (2003). 
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Revenue-sharing plans come in many varieties, such as “percentage 
payments, fixed compact payments, fees and taxes, contributions to 
community funds, and redistribution to nongaming tribes.”81 
 Critics of the Seminole decision complain that revenue sharing 
contravenes congressional intent that tribes be the “primary benefici-
aries” of gaming operations.82 Some claim revenue-sharing provisions 
go so far as to amount to extortion on the part of the states.83 One 
critic noted, “[t]he validity of [revenue-sharing] agreements is dubi-
ous in light of the plain meaning of IGRA, its legislative history, and 
relevant case law addressing similar issues.”84 Nevertheless, tribes feel 
compelled to accept revenue sharing, which the courts and the Secre-
tary of the Interior generally approve so long as the revenue shared 
does not inappropriately exceed the benefit enjoyed by the tribes.85 
 After Seminole, the Secretary promulgated rules to create a secretar-
ial procedure similar to IGRA’s good faith enforcement mechanism.86 
The Secretary did so in order to restore some semblance of the balance 
intended by Congress.87 In Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, the 
State argued that this rule constituted an invalid exercise of agency 
power because IGRA does not grant the Secretary the authority to side-
step a judicial determination that states have failed to negotiate in good 
faith.88 The Secretary responded that the rule restored a crucial part of 
IGRA and thus fulfilled congressional intent.89 The Ninth Circuit hinted 
that, although the rule would have been invalid if adopted before Semi-
nole, the rule might represent a valid exercise of secretarial discretion to 
promote the congressional intent underlying IGRA.90 
E. The Current Political and Economic Environment 
 States and local communities have the potential to receive “exten-
sive economic and social benefits from tribal gaming operations, rang-
ing from increased tax revenues to decreased public entitlement pay-
                                                                                                                      
81 Rausch, supra note 70, at 426. 
82 Rand & Light, supra note 57, at 463. 
83 Fletcher, supra note 10, at 59. 
84 Eric S. Lent, Note, Are States Beating the House? The Validity of Tribal-State Revenue Shar-
ing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 Geo. L.J. 451, 474 (2003). 
85 See Rand, supra note 9, at 986 n.74; Rausch, supra note 70, at 427. 
86 Fletcher, supra note 10, at 65. 
87 Id. at 65–66. 
88 Id. at 66 (citing Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
89 See id. at 65–66. 
90 Id. 
2009] Environmental Bargaining in Indian Gaming Regulation 183 
ments to the disadvantaged.”91 Revenue-sharing provisions have be-
come commonplace, amounting to more than $1 billion in direct pay-
ments to states in 2005.92 
 Despite these benefits, there is considerable and growing backlash 
to Indian gaming.93 Compacting occurs at the tribal-state level, so IGRA 
does not provide local city and county governments a voice in negotiat-
ing compacts.94 This leaves local officials feeling left out of the loop.95 
Many government officials complain that any benefits are vastly out-
weighed by the strain on municipal services.96 Citizens groups are con-
cerned that local authorities have no recourse where Indian casinos 
threaten to decimate local resources or pollute the environment.97 
There is also widespread sentiment that casinos bring with them a host 
of social ills, including noise pollution, traffic, gambling addiction, and 
crime.98 Municipalities fear sovereignty precludes tax collection, land 
use management, and regulation of environmentally hazardous activi-
ties on tribal land—even when the effects spill outside Indian coun-
try.99 
 This apprehension over casino development has been exacer-
bated by tribal efforts to develop off-reservation casinos in closer 
proximity to urban areas in order to maximize profits and offset the 
                                                                                                                      
91 Rand, supra note 9, at 973. 
92 Id. at 986. For example, in 2003 tribes provided $759 million to state and local gov-
ernments. Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Indian Gaming & Tribal Sov-
ereignty: The Casino Compromise 87 (2005). Another study found that in the same 
year, “state and local governments collected approximately $1.5 billion in tax revenue gen-
erated by Indian gaming.” Id. 
93 E.g., Fletcher, supra note 10, at 68–69. “The backlash has resulted from the miscon-
ceptions that Indian tribes, their ‘attack-dog’ lobbyists, and their ‘shady’ gaming manage-
ment and development companies could impose Vegas-style casino operations in Middle 
American communities that do not want them.” Id. at 34–40. (citations omitted). 
94 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2000); see California Performance Review, GG30 Require Native 
American Tribes under the Tribal-State Compact to Enter into Agreements with Local Gov-
ernments to Address the Impacts of Tribal Casinos on Local Communities, http://cpr.ca.gov/ 
CPR_Report/Issues_and_Recommendations/Chapter_1_General_Government/Strength- 
ening_Government_Partnerships/GG30.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009) [hereinafter California 
Performance Review]. 
95Ellen Perlman, Tribes and Tribulations, Governing Mag., Aug. 2007, at 53; California 
Performance Review, supra note 94. 
96 See California Performance Review, supra note 94. 
97 See Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Playing the Political Slots, Time, Dec. 23, 
2003, at 52, 58; Perlman, supra note 95, at 53. 
98 Edward W. McClenathan, Land Use Implications of Casinos and Racinos on Local Gov-
ernments in New York State, 39 Urb. Law. 111, 112 (2007). 
99 California Performance Review, supra note 94; see Roger Romulus Martella, Jr., Note, 
“Not in My State’s Indian Reservation” —A Legislative Fix to Close an Environmental Law Loop-
hole, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1863, 1872 (1994). 
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costs of revenue-sharing agreements.100 Because revenue sharing of-
ten occurs at the state level, municipalities can only hope that the 
state compacts with the tribe to funnel a portion of the revenue shar-
ing to the municipality.101 As a result of this opposition, off-
reservation agreements remain a rarity, as state and local governments 
have been slow to recognize the benefits of tribal gaming.102 
 The backlash has led to considerable lobbying efforts and litiga-
tion to stop off-reservation casino development.103 It has also resulted 
in proposed amendments to IGRA that would curtail off-reservation 
gaming.104 Some argue for legislative reform to fix the problems in 
bargaining power created by Seminole; others seek to prevent tribes 
from pursuing off-reservation development.105 Congress has responded 
to these suggestions with a spate of proposed amendments to IGRA.106 
For example, the 109th Congress contemplated bills that would: re-
quire the Secretary of the Interior to consider the results of an eco-
nomic impact study; eliminate the two-part secretarial determination to 
take land into trust; limit tribes to gaming at one parcel state where the 
tribe has historical ties; eliminate the exceptions to the prohibition on 
gaming on newly acquired lands; and require that a tribe declare its 
intent to engage in gaming when it submits its application for trust 
status.107 None of these bills became law, demonstrating the intensity of 
tribal lobbying efforts and congressional unwillingness to significantly 
amend IGRA.108 
                                                                                                                      
100 See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 40. 
101 California Performance Review, supra note 94. The Secretary consults local officials 
during the two-part determination to take lands into trust for the benefit of tribes. 25 
U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
102 See, e.g., Matthew D. All, John McCain and the Indian Gaming “Backlash”: The Unfortunate 
Irony of S. 2078, 15 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 295, 303–04 (2006). State officials have generally 
resisted off-reservation development projects because they are sometimes “viewed as a loop-
hole in federal law to circumvent state law that says gambling is a crime.” Kolkema, supra note 
35, at 362 (citation omitted). 
103 See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 67–69. 
104 See M. Maureen Murphy, CRS Report for Congress, Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act: Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands 5–6 (2006). 
105 Compare Fletcher, supra note 10, at 71–72 (arguing for legislative reform to restore 
balance destroyed by Seminole), with Brian P. McClatchey, Note, A Whole New Game: Recogniz-
ing the Changing Complexion of Indian Gaming by Removing the “Governor’s Veto” for Gaming on 
“After-Acquired Lands”, 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1227, 1272 (2004) (arguing that “the ‘gov-
ernor’s veto’ should be abandoned in favor of a framework for off-reservation gaming 
which is solely addressed by the Tribal-State gaming compact’s terms”). 
106 See Murphy, supra note 104, at 5–6. 
107 Id. 
108 See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 70. 
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III. Environmental and Land-Use Regulation  
of American Indian Lands 
 For projects on Indian lands, federal environmental laws are “com-
prehensive in scope.”109 Within this framework of subordination to Con-
gress’s plenary power, “tribes possess the right ‘to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them’ without interference from the states.”110 Federal 
environmental laws require that developers of Indian gaming projects 
obtain federal licenses and comply with federal procedures.111 They 
must also assess environmental impacts of the project and comply with 
applicable environmental laws.112 The “EPA retains [environmental] 
regulatory and enforcement authority to the extent it has not been 
delegated to states or tribes.”113 
A. Environmental Protection Under IGRA: The National  
Indian Gaming Commission 
 To oversee the regulation of Indian gambling, IGRA established the 
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC).114 The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) mandates that federal agencies identify 
and consider environmental impact of any agency action “significantly 
affecting the quality of human environment.”115 It appears that the 
NIGC has interpreted NEPA to apply to “major construction of a ca-
sino.”116 If the NIGC concludes that a proposed gaming facility will lead 
to significant environmental impacts, it must either require an Environ-
                                                                                                                      
109 Michael P. O’Connell, Environmental Issues Associated with Indian Gaming, in The 
Gaming Industry on American Indian Lands at 27, 34 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Series No. B4-7077, 1994). 
110 Martella, supra note 99, at 1873 (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. 324, 332 (1983)). 
111 O’Connell, supra note 109, at 34–35; see Kevin K. Washburn, The Mechanics of Indian 
Gaming Management Contract Approval, 8 Gaming L. Rev. 333, 343 (2004) (discussing Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, and other requirements im-
posed by federal law). 
112 See generally O’Connell, supra note 109, at 34–61 (discussing the federal laws that 
govern casino development). 
113 H. Scott Althouse, Idaho Nibbles at Montana: Carving Out a Third Exception for Tribal 
Jurisdiction over Environmental and Natural Resource Management, 31 Envtl. L. 721, 730 
(2001). 
114 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (2000). 
115 Washburn, supra note 111, at 343 (citing National Environmental Policy Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (2000)). 
116 Id. (noting NIGC’s informal interpretation of its responsibilities under NEPA). 
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mental Impact Statement (EIS) to catalogue those impacts or else advise 
the requesting parties of the steps necessary to avoid the impacts.117 
 Furthermore, IGRA requires the NIGC to ensure that each tribal 
gaming compact contains a series of mandatory provisions.118 Among 
these is the requirement that all proposed contracts contain a provision 
ensuring that “the construction and maintenance of the gaming facility, 
and the operation of that gaming is conducted in a manner which ade-
quately protects the environment and the public health and safety 
. . . .”119 Seeking to balance its reluctance to encroach upon tribal sov-
ereignty with this Congressional mandate,120 the NIGC established and 
sought the assistance of a tribal advisory commission.121 With the help 
of the advisory committee, the NIGC published a proposed regulation 
that required tribes proposing a gaming facility to submit an environ-
mental management plan that addressed: “(1) Emergency prepared-
ness; (2) food & water; (3) construction & maintenance; (4) hazardous 
and other materials; and (5) sanitation.”122 These plans would then 
form the basis of NIGC oversight of the gaming facility.123 
 Facing strong opposition to the proposed rule,124 the NIGC opted 
for a “simpler, less programmatic approach” when it adopted its final 
rule.125 Noting that its regulatory oversight burden under IGRA is one 
of “limited and discrete responsibility,”126 the NIGC’s final rule gave 
tribes discretion as to how to adequately address environment, public 
                                                                                                                      
117 Id. 
118 25 U.S.C. § 2710. 
119 Id. § 2710(b)(2)(E). Class III gaming facilities meet the requirements of class II 
gaming facilities. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
120 Compare Environment, Public Health, and Safety, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,109, 46,111 ( Jul. 
12, 2002) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 580) (“[A]s a fundamental principle of federal law 
and policy, tribal governments have the right and authority to make their own choices in 
exercising their governmental powers”), with 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,110 (“[I]t is clear that 
Congress intended the Commission to exercise at least some degree of general oversight 
authority with respect to whether or not a gaming facility is being operated in compliance 
with the Congressionally mandated provisions in tribal gaming ordinances.”). 
121 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,110. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 46,110–11. Some critics argued that the regulations placed an undue burden 
on tribes. Id. at 46,110. Other argued that the plan exceeded the authority granted to 
NIGC by Congress and that other governmental agencies were better equipped to address 
environmental, public health, and safety concerns. Id. Furthermore, states and local gov-
ernments argued that they should have some role in the development of the gaming facil-
ity plans. Id. 
125 Id. at 46,111. 
126 Id. 
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health, and safety concerns.127 Under this hands-off approach, tribes 
may develop oversight and enforcement procedures on their own, or 
they may contract with state, local, or federal governments and even 
private entities to provide these services.128 
 Some fear that this philosophy leads to lax enforcement.129 To be 
sure, the NIGC’s own guidelines state the Commission will “proceed 
[with] enforcement only where no corrective action has been under-
taken within a reasonable time and such inaction results in a condition 
of imminent jeopardy to the environment, public health and safety.”130 
The past practice of NIGC lends credence to this fear: as of 2004, NIGC 
had yet to deny a “management contract because of significant impacts 
on the environment” and had “never even determined that a casino 
construction project caused significant environmental impacts requir-
ing the preparation of an environmental impact statement.”131 
B. State Attempts at Environmental Enforcement on Indian Reservations 
 Although the distinction articulated in Cabazon between civil/ 
regulatory and criminal/prohibitory may at times be unclear, environ-
mental regulations are most likely civil/regulatory and thus do not ex-
tend onto Indian lands without the consent of the tribe.132 States often 
seek to overcome this jurisdictional hurdle to assert some form of regu-
latory control.133 In order to do so, a state must either seek tribal con-
sent or else the need for regulation must qualify as an “exceptional cir-
                                                                                                                      
127 See 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,111–12. 
128 Id. The NIGC believes that its “key objective is to confirm that standards and en-
forcement systems are in place” and places less emphasis on “the particular manner in 
which compliance with tribal environment, public health, and safety standards is en-
forced.” Id. 
129 See Washburn, supra note 111, at 343–44. There is concern that NIGC feels NEPA 
compliance places Indian casinos at a comparative disadvantage over non-Indian ones 
because non-Indian casinos are not subjected to NEPA requirements. Id. 
130 Environment, Public Health and Safety, 67 Fed. Reg. at 46,112. 
131 See Washburn, supra note 111, at 343. Professor Washburn notes that in every in-
stance in which the NEPA applied, the NIGC Chairman has issued a “finding of no signifi-
cant impact.” Id. at 344. To be fair, though, these FONSIs have often come after the tribes 
have taken steps to ameliorate environmental impacts. Id. Professor Washburn wisely notes 
that the tribes may be well served by preparing an EIS “to avoid litigation that will further 
slow approval.” Id. 
132 See, e.g., Kiel, supra note 36, at P-11. 
133 See Justin Neel Baucom, Comment, Bringing Down the House: As States Attempt to Cur-
tail Indian Gaming, Have We Forgotten the Foundational Principles of Tribal Sovereignty?, 30 Am. 
Indian L. Rev. 423, 424 (2006); see Martella, supra note 99, at 1885–86 (discussing the 
jurisdictional hurdles states face in asserting environmental regulatory control on reserva-
tions). 
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cumstance,” thereby allowing a state to “assert jurisdiction over the on-
reservation activities of tribal members.”134 
 Cabazon—illustrating this “exceptional circumstances” test—holds 
that “[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted if it interferes or is incompati-
ble with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the 
state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state author-
ity.”135 This change in attitude towards tribal sovereignty on tribal land 
is articulated in Nevada v. Hicks, where the Court noted “that the Indi-
ans' right to make their own laws and be governed by them does not 
exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation.”136 
 Thus, public policy may dictate that state and local laws reach on-
reservation activities so long as the law represents a compelling state 
interest and it does not interfere with reservation self-government or 
“impair a right granted or reserved by federal law.”137 For example, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of 
N.Y. placed a limit on tribal sovereignty when it prevented tribes from 
asserting sovereign rights in order to avoid paying property taxes for 
recently purchased land parcels.138 The Court concluded that allowing 
the tribe to assert sovereignty—and thus removing the lands from mu-
nicipal tax rolls—would “‘seriously burde[n] the administration of state 
and local governments’ and would adversely affect [neighboring] 
landowners.”139 In a few other cases, states have successfully met the 
exceptional circumstances test to preserve threatened species and pro-
vide injunctive relief to mandate an environmental impact statement.140 
                                                                                                                      
134 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983); see Fletcher, supra 
note 10, at 48; Martella, supra note 99, at 1878–79, 1884 (noting that the exceptional cir-
cumstances test is likely insurmountable with respect to environmental regulation). 
135 California v. Cabazon Mission Band of Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (emphasis 
added) (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 333, 334 (1983)). 
136 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001). 
137 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). 
138 See 544 U.S. 197, 219–20 (2005). 
139 Id. at 200 (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994)) (first alteration in 
original) (citation omitted); see McClenathan, supra note 98, at 113. City of Sherrill may have 
lasting negative effects on tribal sovereignty and may hinder tribal efforts to repurchase 
“illegally taken land and assert[] sovereign rights over the newly acquired land parcels.” 
Sohn, supra note 2, at 161. 
140 See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 175–76 (1977) (hold-
ing that species preservation justified state regulation of steelhead trout as a conservation 
measure); New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(holding state and town provided sufficient evidence to grant an injunctive order to stop 
construction of a large facility on the reservation); Concern, Inc. v. Pataki, 801 N.Y.S.2d 
232, 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (prohibiting further planning and construction of an off-
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IV. The Compacting Process 
A. Procedural Ambiguity: IGRA’s Silence on State Procedures for  
Negotiating and Ratifying Compacts 
 IGRA created a new relationship between states and tribes, but 
Congress left several key issues unresolved.141 For instance, Congress 
did not articulate the procedural requirements for state governments 
to enter into compacts.142 As a result, state courts have developed new 
bodies of state constitutional law to develop procedures states should 
follow to enter into compacts.143 Many states—including California— 
require that the governor negotiate tribal compacts, which must then 
be ratified by the legislature.144 For example, the Florida Supreme 
Court recently held that “the Governor does not have the constitu-
tional authority to bind the State to a gaming compact that clearly de-
parts from the State’s public policy by legalizing types of gaming that 
are illegal everywhere else in the state.”145 In contrast, the Arizona legis-
lature enacted a statute stating that if a tribe that does not have a com-
pact cannot successfully negotiate a compact with the governor, then 
the governor is required to execute a standard compact with the tribe.146 
In other states, courts have held that the governor retains the right to 
negotiate and enter into compacts because the governor retains the 
right to “transact business on behalf of the state.”147 As state constitu-
tional law slowly develops, tribes must wait until the state’s procedure 
for entering into a compact is resolved, risk operating an illegal casino, 
or forego development.148 
                                                                                                                      
reservation casino until the state conducted a draft environmental impact statement as 
required by the State Environmental Quality Review Act). 
141 See generally Kevin K. Washburn, A.B.A. Ctr. for Continuing Legal. Educ., In-
dian Gaming: A Primer on the Development of Indian Gaming, the NIGC, and Sev-
eral Important Unresolved Issues 6 (2002) (citing unresolved issues in IGRA). 
142 See Kiel, supra note 36, at P-13; Washburn, supra note 141, at 6 (citing New Mexico 
ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995)). 
143 Washburn, supra note 141, at 6 (citing Clark, 904 P.2d at 18). 
144 Cal. Const. art. 4, § 19. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1185 
(1992) (holding that the governor had the power to negotiate the terms of a gaming com-
pact, but did not have the “power to bind the State to the terms thereof”). 
145 Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 990 So.2d 1035, 1038 (Fla. 2008). 
146 Washburn, supra note 141, at 6 (citing Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. 
Hull, 945 P.2d 818, 826 (Ariz. 1997)). 
147 Id. at 6–7 (citing Willis v. Fordice, 850 F. Supp. 523, 532–33 (S.D. Miss. 1994)). 
148 Id. at 7. 
190 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:171 
B. Scope of Compact Provisions 
 IGRA “forbids the assertion of state civil or criminal jurisdiction 
over class III gaming except when the tribe and the state have negoti-
ated a compact that permits state intervention.”149 In enacting IGRA, 
Congress placed a rough boundary over the scope of permissible provi-
sions.150 IGRA permits gaming compact provisions that directly apply to 
the regulation of Indian gaming.151 It does not, however, address regula-
tion of environmental impacts.152 Of the enumerated list of permitted 
provisions, the last offers the most leeway to parties to negotiate for en-
vironmental regulatory control.153 These address the “standards for the 
operation of such activity and maintenance of the gaming facility” and “any 
other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activi-
ties.”154 The issue thus becomes how broadly courts interpret the scope 
of permitted provisions. For example, IGRA “does not specifically au-
thorize application of state labor laws, building codes, or other general 
regulations.”155 That said, in In re Gaming Related Cases, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that labor provisions are “directly related to the operation of 
gaming activities” as contemplated by the catch-all provision of IGRA 
section 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii).156 Following In re Gaming, some compacts 
have utilized this catchall provision to include environmental regula-
tion.157 
C. Off-Reservation Land Acquisition: New “Guidance” 
 IGRA permits gaming on Indian lands where “the gaming activity 
is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a 
State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, 
                                                                                                                      
149 Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 690 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[A] 
state ordinarily may regulate casino gambling on Indian lands only in pursuance of a con-
sensual compact.”). 
150 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (2000). 
151 Id. 
152 O’Connell, supra note 109, at 31; see Sohn, supra note 2, at 151–52. 
153 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii); see, e.g., Sohn, supra note 2, at 151–52 (citing In re 
Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1115–17 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
154 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vi)–(vii) (emphasis added). 
155 See Sohn, supra note 2, at 151. 
156 In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at 1115–16; see Sohn, supra note 2, at 151–52. 
157 See, e.g., County of Amador v. City of Plymouth, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 704, 713 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (subjecting off-reservation impacts to California Environmental Quality Act); 
Cal. Commerce Casino, Inc. v. Schwarzenegger, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (“The compact amendments also provided for enhanced environmental protection 
and employee rights.”). 
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prohibit such gaming activity.”158 Section 2703 of IGRA defines Indian 
lands as lands within a reservation or lands held in trust by the federal 
government for the benefit of Indians “over which an Indian tribe 
exercises governmental power.”159 
 IGRA prohibits gaming on lands acquired in trust after October 
17, 1988 unless the tribe can demonstrate an enumerated exception.160 
Tribes often seek to establish gaming on “newly acquired lands” under 
the “two-part determination” exception.161 The two-part determination 
exception was intended to give the Secretary and local communities a 
voice in whether to allow off-reservation casinos.162 Under this excep-
tion, IGRA directs the Secretary to decide whether to take off-
reservation land into federal trust for purposes of casino develop-
ment.163 This exception requires the Secretary to consider whether the 
acquisition: (1) is in the “best interest” of the tribe; and (2) is not det-
rimental to the surrounding community.164 To make an informed deci-
sion, the Secretary must first consult with “appropriate State and local 
officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes” before seek-
ing the gubernatorial concurrence of the state in which the gaming 
activity is to be conducted.165 
 There has been considerable controversy over the two-part deter-
mination exception.166 Some argue that gubernatorial concurrence 
should be abandoned and that off-reservation development should be 
part of the negotiating process between tribes and states.167 Removal of 
                                                                                                                      
158 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5). 
159 Id. § 2703(4)(A)–(B). 
160 Id. § 2719(a)–(b). 
161 Id. § 2719(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., All, supra note 102, at 302–03; Rand, Meister & Light, 
supra note 6, at 195. 
162 Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 195; Indian Gaming Paper, supra note 58, at 5. 
163 25 U.S.C § 2719(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 195–96. 
164 25 U.S.C § 2719(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 195. 
165 25 U.S.C § 2719(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., Jensen, supra note 6, at 688–89. 
166 See Department of the Interior’s Recently Released Guidance on Taking Land into Trust for In-
dian Tribes and Its Ramifications: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 
110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Washburn testimony] (statement of Kevin K. Washburn, 
Professor, Harvard Law School). Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 197. Many see gu-
bernatorial concurrence as an “extraordinary grant of power” by Congress that grants gover-
nors an absolute power to determine the scope of off-reservation gaming in the state. All, 
supra note 102, at 296. That said, in Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. United States, 
the Ninth Circuit held that this requirement of gubernatorial concurrence did not violate 
the Appointments and Property Clauses of the Constitution. Carter W. Hick, The Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act: Why Tribes Can Build Casinos Off the Reservation, 10 Gaming L. Rev. 110, 
117–18 (2006) (citing 110 F.3d 688, 697–98 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
167 See, e.g., All, supra note 102, at 306–08 (discussing a Senate bill that proposed to 
remove the gubernatorial concurrence requirement). 
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gubernatorial concurrence lies at the heart of amendments proposed 
by Senator John McCain aimed at preventing a “backlash against In-
dian gaming generally.”168 Others argue that the two-part determina-
tion is essential because it provides states the ability to walk away from 
negotiations involving unwanted off-reservation development and “al-
lows states and tribes to think creatively about how to situate off-
reservation gaming so that it maximizes its success and minimizes [the 
negative] impact on the local community.”169 Application of the two-
part determination remains a rarity in part because of this conten-
tion.170 As of early 2008, only four times has a tribe successfully ac-
quired land in trust under this exception.171 
 The two-part determination informs agency action for land-into-
trust acquisitions for the purpose of off-reservation casino develop-
ment.172 It does not, however, grant the Secretary the authority to take 
land into trust.173 That power is derived from the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934 (IRA), which vests the Secretary with the discretion and au-
thority to acquire an interest in lands for Indian use.174 Legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress intended the IRA to foster off-reservation 
land acquisitions to promote economic independence for tribes.175 
 In 1980, the Secretary issued guidelines—codified at 25 C.F.R. 
Part 151—to direct the process of taking land into trust for the bene-
fit of tribes.176 Under this rule, as the distance from the reservation 
increases, the Secretary applies “greater scrutiny” to the purported 
tribal benefits of the proposed acquisition and gives “greater weight” 
                                                                                                                      
168 Fletcher, supra note 10, at 39 (citing 151 Cong. Rec. S13389–90 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 
2005) (statement of Sen. McCain)). 
169 All, supra note 102, at 309 (noting that the “best location” for a casino is not neces-
sarily on-reservation). 
170 See Washburn testimony, supra note 166, at 2 (noting that the high political costs as-
sociated with off-reservation casino development may lead the Secretary of the Interior to 
deny trust applications). 
171 Department of the Interior’s Recently Released Guidance on Taking Land into Trust for In-
dian Tribes and Its Ramifications: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 
110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Artman testimony] (statement of Carl Artman, Assistant 
Secretary for Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior). 
172 See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000); see, e.g., Jensen, supra note 6, at 688–89; 
Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 196. 
173 25 U.S.C. § 2719(c) (“Nothing in this section shall affect or diminish the authority 
and responsibility of the Secretary to take land into trust.”); Artman testimony, supra note 
171, at 1; Indian Gaming Paper, supra note 58, at 7. 
174 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000); Artman testimony, supra note 171, at 1. 
175 See Indian Gaming Paper, supra note 58, at 8. 
176 Land Acquisitions, 25 C.F.R. § 151 (2007); see Artman testimony, supra note 171, at 
1–2; Indian Gaming Paper, supra note 58, at 8–9. 
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to the concerns of affected state and local governments.177 The rule 
does not specify how the Secretary must approach these inquiries.178 
 On January 4, 2008, the Department of the Interior released a 
memorandum to provide guidance on the application of Part 151.179 
In order to apply “greater scrutiny” to the tribe’s justification of the 
anticipated benefits as the distance increases between the proposed 
acquisition and the existing reservation, the guidance focuses inquiry 
on the “commutable distance” between the two.180 The Secretary rea-
soned that if the proposed land acquisition is not within a commut-
able distance to the reservation, then tribal residents on the reserva-
tion must either move away from the reservation to take advantage of 
employment opportunities or forego job opportunities if they decide 
to remain on the reservation.181 The Secretary reasoned that either 
course of action risks negative impacts to reservation life.182 
 In order to apply “greater weight” to the concerns of state and lo-
cal governments, the memorandum recommends that the Secretary 
consider state and local concerns of: “1) jurisdictional problems and 
potential conflicts of land use; and 2) the removal of the land from the 
tax rolls.”183 The memorandum further recommends that applications 
under Part 151 should include “intergovernmental agreements” nego-
tiated between the tribe and state and local governments.184 A lack of 
agreement should “weigh heavily” against the application.185 Although 
reviewers must evaluate the “greater weight” requirement regardless of 
the distance between the proposed acquisition and the reservation, 
both of the reasons supplied in the memorandum reference increased 
distances.186 First, the Secretary reasons that as the distance between 
the reservation and the proposed land acquisition increases, there is an 
increased likelihood that transfer to Indian jurisdiction will disrupt “es-
                                                                                                                      
177 25 C.F.R. § 151.11(b); see, e.g., Hick, supra note 166, at 115–16; Jesnsen, supra note 
6, at 693–94. 
178 Guidance Memorandum, supra note 8, at 1. 
179 Id. at 2–3. 
180 Id. at 3 (“A commutable distance is considered to be the distance a reservation 
resident could reasonably commute on a regular basis to work at a tribal gaming facility 
located off-reservation.”). 
181 Id. at 4. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 5; see Jensen, supra note 6, at 690 (noting that the Department now seeks de-
tailed information about the “‘detrimental impacts to the surrounding community,’ such 
as environmental damage . . . .”). 
184 Guidance Memorandum, supra note 8, at 5. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. at 3, 5. 
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tablished governmental patterns” of the municipality surrounding the 
proposed land acquisition.187 Second, increased distances make it more 
difficult for tribal governments “to efficiently project and exercise its 
governmental and regulatory powers.”188 
 The guidance memorandum also suggests that the application 
contain a comprehensive analysis of the effects of the proposed gaming 
facility on state and local zoning and land use requirements.189 The 
study should include whether the proposed gaming facility would cause 
negative impacts such as traffic, noise, and development issues.190 The 
memorandum suggests that gaming adjacent to “National Parks, Na-
tional Monuments, [or] Federally designated conservation areas” may 
constitute an “incompatible use.”191 
 On February 27, 2008, the House Committee on Natural Re-
sources held a hearing on the new guidance memorandum.192 At the 
hearing, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Carl Artman testified 
that the new guidance is needed because the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
is “not accustomed to assessing applications for land 100, 200, or 1500 
miles away from a tribe’s reservation.”193 
 Tribes testifying at the hearing objected to the memorandum, 
claiming it was a paternalistic rule that violated the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act and the congressional intent of IGRA.194 Hazel Hindsley, 
Chairwoman for the St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, argued 
that the memorandum signified the Department’s aversion to off-
reservation applications because it used the broader language in Part 
                                                                                                                      
187 Id. at 5. This concern echoes the Supreme Court’s holding in City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., where the Court found that recent land acquisitions by the 
Oneida Nation were subject to local taxation because exemption would subject state and 
local governments to undue burden. 544 U.S. 197, 20 (2005). 
188 Guidance Memorandum, supra note 8, at 5. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 5–6. 
192 See Department of the Interior’s Recently Released Guidance on Taking Land into Trust for In-
dian Tribes and Its Ramifications: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 
110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Rahall Statement] (statement of Rep. Nick Rahall, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on Natural Resources). 
193 Artman testimony, supra note 171, at 2. Assistant Secretary Artman testified that the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs “is used to dealing with requests for land 20, 30, or 50 miles away 
from a tribe’s reservation.” Id. 
194 See, e.g., Department of the Interior’s Recently Released Guidance on Taking Land into Trust 
for Indian Tribes and Its Ramifications: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Re-
sources, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Skibine testimony] (statement of Alex Skibine, 
Professor, University of Utah College of Law). 
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151 to deny applications before evaluating the “best interest” of the 
tribes under the two-part determination.195 
 Preeminent Indian Law scholars have echoed these concerns.196 
For example, Harvard Law School professor Kevin Washburn testified 
that the memorandum “misunderstands” the benefits of gaming be-
cause gaming is about “revenue, not jobs.”197 Professor Washburn fur-
ther argued that off-reservation gaming may be better than on-
reservation gaming—especially when supported by state and local 
governments—because it places casinos in communities that are will-
ing to “put up with the inevitable negative externalities” of gaming in 
exchange for economic development.198 Professor Washburn also ar-
gues that noncontroversial off-reservation development should be 
approved, and that the “Secretary should not become an obstacle to 
joint efforts at economic development when tribes and states agree on 
the value of an off-reservation Indian gaming operation.”199 
 Similarly, scholars Kathryn Rand, Steven Andrew Light, and Alan 
Meister have rightly criticized the “memo’s procedural genesis and sub-
stantive ‘guidance.’”200 Their article persuasively raises several legal 
questions on whether the memorandum: (1) constitutes an administra-
tive legislative ruling subject to the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) 
meets the Chevron201 test for judicial deference to agency decisions or is 
                                                                                                                      
195 See Department of the Interior’s Recently Released Guidance on Taking Land into Trust for 
Indian Tribes and Its Ramifications: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 
110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Hinsdley testimony] (statement of the Honorable Hazel 
Hindsley, Tribal Chairwoman, St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin). 
196 See, e.g., Washburn testimony, supra note 166; Jensen, supra note 6, at 694–95; Rand, 
Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 198–206. 
197 Washburn testimony, supra note 166. Washburn argues that “[r]evenues from off-
reservation gaming operations pay for tribal jobs on the reservation in a variety of areas, 
including healthcare, elderly services, social services, education, [and] law enforcement 
. . . many of which provide direct services to reservation residents.” Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. (arguing that “no federal interest justifies the Secretary’s refusal to take land 
into trust when tribes, local communities and the state’s governor agree”). 
200 Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 194. 
201 Under the Chevron test, which courts apply to review final agency decisions: 
The first step is to ask whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at 
issue; if so, then the agency (and the court) must give effect to the unambi-
guous intent of Congress. If the statute is silent or ambiguous, then courts 
must employ Chevron’s second step and ask whether the agency’s decision on 
the issue is a reasonable construction of the statute. Agency regulations and 
actions should be given deference by the courts “unless they are arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to” the enabling statute, and “considerable weight” is 
given to an agency’s reconciliation of conflicting policies or exercise of par-
ticular expertise. 
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instead arbitrary and capricious; and (3) undermines congressional 
intent.202 
V. A New Model of Cooperation in the Tribal-State 
Compacting Process 
 The Big Lagoon Rancheria’s Barstow proposal enjoyed the sup-
port of the tribe, the city of Barstow, and the governor’s office, yet the 
proposal failed because of the “commutable distance” guidance 
memorandum, which was possibly fueled by the Department of the 
Interior’s “negative attitude towards off-reservation casinos.”203 De-
spite this failure, the proposal encompasses a creative new way to ap-
proach the compacting process—one that addresses federal, state, 
tribal, and local concerns.204 The Barstow proposal highlights the abil-
ity to devise creative compacts to address pressing environmental and 
social concerns.205 States should emulate this broad interpretation of 
the provisions permitted by IGRA and actively seek tribal consent for 
state environmental regulation over activities that adversely affect the 
off-reservation environment. In exchange, tribes should be afforded 
greater deference beyond the “commutable distance” guidance 
memorandum to include off-reservation casino development that is 
more in tune with the legislative intent of both IRA and IGRA.206 
A. Expand the Scope of Compact Provisions Permitted Under IGRA 
 IGRA provides little direct support for the contention that envi-
ronmental regulatory control is a permitted compact provision.207 A 
broad interpretation of section 2710 would mitigate state concerns re-
garding the loss of environmental regulatory control over casino con-
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 201 (emphasis added) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)). 
202 Id. at 200–03. The article also echoes several of the economic concerns raised by 
Professor Washburn. Id. at 203–06. 
203 Artman Letter, supra note 7, at 2–3; see Hindsley testimony, supra note 195 (refer-
encing Secretary Kempthorne’s negative attitude toward off-reservation casinos). 
204 See Governor’s Press Release, supra note 4, at 1. 
205 See Big Lagoon Compact, supra note 1, at 62 (requiring a tribal environmental im-
pact report and intergovernmental agreements between the tribe and the city to address 
environmental concerns as a precondition to construction). 
206 See All, supra note 102, at 312 (arguing that governors and tribes should be able to 
“think creatively about how to shape off-reservation gaming proposals”). 
207 See Sohn, supra note 2, at 151. 
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struction and operation.208 Some members of Congress cautioned 
against a broad interpretation.209 Nevertheless, states have begun to 
take advantage of the “unprecedented degree of freedom” to seek such 
regulations in the compacting process.210 Recent court decisions rein-
force this broad interpretation.211 The compacts negotiated since Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida suggest that states enjoy a bargaining power 
beyond the scope contemplated by Congress in IGRA.212 Although 
most states see revenue sharing as a primary goal, a few have begun to 
adopt a more holistic approach to seek tribal consent for greater state 
environmental oversight.213 
 The most effective vehicle to achieve this tribal-state cooperation is 
for the tribe to consent.214 A tribal-state compact is essentially “a con-
tract, subject to the ordinary rules of contract construction.”215 Fram-
ing compacts as a contractual issue, parties should have flexibility be-
yond the limiting terms of IGRA, provided the tribe voluntarily agrees 
to waive sovereign power.216 This waiver must be express and constitute 
                                                                                                                      
208 See id. at 151–52 (citing In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1115–17 (9th 
Cir. 2003)) (discussing the broad interpretation of IGRA’s “catch-all” provision—an inter-
pretation that would deem acceptable a “wide array of state regulatory laws”). 
209 See id., at 151 n.109 (citing 134 Cong. Rec. 12,651 (1988) (quoting Senator Inouye, 
134 Cong. Rec. S24024–25 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1988)) (“There is no intent on the part of 
Congress that the compacting methodology be used in such areas as taxation, water rights, 
environmental regulation, and land use . . . .”)). 
210 Id. at 151–52 (citing Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at 1115–17); see Big Lagoon 
Compact, supra note 1, at 66–67 (requiring intergovernmental agreements between the 
tribe and the City of Barstow). 
211 See, e.g., County of Amador v. City of Plymouth, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 704, 713 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (subjecting off-reservation impacts to California Environmental Quality Act); 
Cal. Commerce Casino, Inc. v. Schwarzenegger, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (“The compact amendments also provided for enhanced environmental protection 
and employee rights.”). 
212 Fletcher, supra note 10, at 59 (noting that states demanded a “cut of the profits 
from class III gaming”); see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (not-
ing that tribes could no longer sue states for refusing to negotiate in good faith). In short, 
the compacting process has given states an “unprecedented degree of freedom” to apply 
civil regulations against tribal casinos. Sohn, supra note 2, at 151 (citation omitted). 
213 See Schwarzenegger, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630; see Fletcher, supra note 10, at 57; Perlman, 
supra note 95, at 53; Sohn, supra note 2, at 150–51; Legislative Analyst’s Office, California 
Tribal Casinos: Questions and Answers, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2007/tribal_ 
casinos/tribal_casinos_020207.aspx (Feb. 2007). 
214 See, e.g., Environment, Public Health, and Safety, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,109, 46,111–12 
( Jul. 12, 2002) (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 580). 
215 See Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1098 (W.D. Wis. 2007) 
(citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987)). 
216 See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing 
unmistakable waivers of sovereign power); All, supra note 102, at 312–13. 
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an “unmistakable waiver.”217 Absent such a waiver, tribes retain civil 
regulatory authority.218 To illustrate, in Allen v. Gold Country Casino, the 
Ninth Circuit held that waiver of tribal sovereign immunity may not be 
implied.219 Similarly, in New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, the 
court held that a tribal-state compact provision waiving sovereign im-
munity constituted an express waiver.220 Indeed, the NIGC’s own regu-
lations contemplate that tribes have the option to enter into contracts 
with state, local, and federal governments as well as private entities for 
services to meet the NIGC’s environment, public health, and safety 
standards.221 
 Tribes may feel compelled to cooperate, especially when they seek 
off-reservation gaming opportunities under the two-part determina-
tion. Since the decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, courts and 
the Department often acquiesce when states seek goals beyond the 
scope of IGRA.222 Furthermore, despite the guidance memorandum’s 
faulty reasoning,223 Department regulations do contemplate that as the 
distance between the tribe’s reservation and the land to be acquired 
increases, the Secretary shall give greater weight to the concerns of 
state and local governments.224 Factors for consideration include “the 
impact of removing the land from state and local tax rolls, any jurisdic-
tional problems, and potential conflicts of land use.”225 
 For what it is worth, the guidance memorandum does warn that 
tribes that are located away from the land acquisition may find it more 
difficult to “efficiently project and exercise . . . governmental and regu-
latory powers.”226 Without commenting on the dubious accuracy of this 
assertion, it is possible that apprehensive municipalities will bring con-
cerns such as this to state governors, who hold veto power to kill politi-
                                                                                                                      
217 See Aspaas, 77 F.3d at 1135. “Unless a tribe affirmatively elects to have State laws and 
State jurisdiction extend to tribal lands, the Congress will not unilaterally impose or allow 
State jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of Indian gaming activities.” S. Rep. 
No. 100-446, at 5–6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075–06. 
218 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 877–78 (1996). 
219 See 464 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2006). 
220 78 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 
221 Environment, Public Health, and Safety, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,109, 46,111 ( Jul. 12, 2002) 
(to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 580). 
222 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see, e.g., Washburn, supra note 74, at 441; Rausch, supra note 70, 
at 426; Sohn, supra note 2, at 152. 
223 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
224 Land Acquisitions, 25 C.F.R. § 151.11 (2007). 
225 Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 196. 
226 Guidance Memorandum, supra note 8, at 5. 
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cally unpopular land acquisitions.227 To illustrate, in 2005 Governor 
Schwarzenegger issued a proclamation opposing reservation shopping 
in urban areas and has “made local support . . . an essential require-
ment” for any gaming projects in the state.228 
 The focus on political support has led to gaming compacts that 
include provisions that address the environmental affects of gaming 
development.229 For example, California has leveraged local support 
for gaming to successfully negotiate for environmental regulatory over-
sight.230 The 1999 California Model Compact includes a section regard-
ing off-reservation environmental impacts.231 The model included a 
tribal pledge to “[m]ake good faith efforts to mitigate any and all such 
significant adverse off-reservation environmental impacts.”232 In 2004, 
California negotiated amendments to five gaming compacts to require 
“enhanced environmental protection and employee rights.”233 The 
2004 amendment cannot affect the federal NEPA requirement that 
tribes prepare an Environmental Impact Statement prior to breaking 
ground,234 but it goes beyond this requirement by including new lan-
guage in the compacts to promote discussion with local governments 
and arbitration clauses to solve impasses.235 The 2004 compacts require 
that tribes negotiate with local governments to address environmental, 
public safety, infrastructure, and other demands related to casinos.236 
 NIGC rules anticipate this cooperation and even contemplate in-
tergovernmental contracts under which the tribes receive regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
227 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000); see, e.g., Jensen, supra note 6, at 690. 
228 Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Anne Bishop, Reservation Shopping 101, 9 Gaming L. 
Rev. 439, 444 (2005) (citing Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Proclamation on Tribal 
Gaming Policy (May 18, 2005), available at http://www.schwarzenegger.com/en/news/ 
uptotheminute/news_upto_Proclamation37.asp? sec=news&subsec=uptotheminute). 
229 See California Model Tribal-State Compact § 10.8 (1999), available at http:// 
www.sycuancompact.com/downloads/1999_compact.pdf. 
230 Big Lagoon Compact, supra note 1, at 66–67 (requiring an enforceable agreement 
between the tribe and City of Barstow to address impact on the off-reservation environ-
ment). 
231 See id. Based on the model compact, tribes will: determine any significant adverse 
impacts on the off-reservation environment; submit environmental impact reports to the 
state for distribution to the public; discuss environmental mitigation action with city and 
county officials; and provide an opportunity for public comment. During casino operation, 
the tribe shall inform the public of the project and make good faith efforts to mitigate any 
and all such significant adverse off-reservation environmental impacts. Id. 
232 See California Model Tribal-State Compact § 10.8.2(5)(b)(2). 
233 Cal. Commerce Casino, Inc. v. Schwarzenegger, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 630 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
234 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000). 
235 See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 95, at 54. 
236 Legislative Analyst’s Office, supra note 213. 
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and enforcement services to protect the environment, public health, 
and safety.237 NIGC regulations permit that tribes form these intergov-
ernmental contracts with state, local and federal governments, and 
even private entities.238 Because NIGC grants tribes such wide latitude 
to implement standards, tribes have the opportunity to work with local 
communities to overcome regulatory stumbling blocks in the compact-
ing process. Big Rancheria’s willingness to swap development right at 
its reservation for the opportunity to conduct a casino 500 miles off-
reservation demonstrates this willingness.239 The Rancheria is not 
alone. For example, Wisconsin's gaming compacts now require that 
tribal gaming facilities comply with state codes regulating electrical 
wiring, fire prevention, and sanitation.240 California’s United Auburn 
Indian Community agreed to “follow all local land use ordinances, 
create an environmental review document, pay for enhanced law en-
forcement and fire protection, improve local roads, compensate the 
county for lost taxes and establish a Tribal-County Advisory Council to 
resolve local issues.”241 California’s Rumsey Band of Wintun Indians 
agreed to comply with local environmental requirements, pay annual 
road maintenance fees, and to fund traffic mitigation efforts.242 
B. Allow Tribes Greater Deference in Off-Reservation Land Acquisitions 
Beyond that Demonstrated by the “Guidance Memorandum” 
 The commutable distance guidance memorandum misconstrues 
the legislative intent of the IRA, and in the context of Indian gaming, 
ignores both the rationale for the two-part determination and previous 
findings by the Department.243 Without commenting in detail on the 
                                                                                                                      
237 Environment, Public Health and Safety, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,109, 46,109 ( July 12, 2002) 
(to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 580). 
238 Id. 
239 See Governor’s Press Release, supra note 4. 
240 See e.g., Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians and State of Wisconsin, 
Gaming Compact of 1991 § XIV(A), http://www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp? 
docid=2127. 
241 California Performance Review, supra note 94 (citing Press Release, Placer County, 
Supervisors Reluctantly Approve MOU for Casino, Auburn, California, August 25, 1999). 
242 Id. (citing Intergovernmental Agreement Between the County of Yolo and the 
Rumsey Bank of Wintun Indians Concerning Mitigation for Off-Reservation Impacts Re-
sulting from the Tribe's Casino Expansion and Hotel Project (2002)). 
243 See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000); 25 C.F.R. § 151.11(2007); Rand, Meister & 
Light, supra note 6, at 198; Washburn testimony, supra note 166, at 2–3. 
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dubious legal basis of the guidance,244 the rule should be scrapped be-
cause its determination as to what constitutes “negative consequences 
of reservation life” is paternalistic, may violate the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act (APA), and unduly minimizes the economic benefits of off-
reservation gambling.245 
1. Misplaced Reliance on Distance from the Reservation 
 When a tribe proposes an off-reservation casino, the Secretary is 
usually presented with the decision under IRA to take the land into trust 
at the same time it makes the two-part determination under IGRA.246 
IGRA clearly bases this determination on whether acquisition of the 
land “would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, 
and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community . . . .”247 
The Department’s “greater scrutiny/greater weight” evaluation criteria 
effectively provide the Department with more discretion to decline a 
trust application under its own regulations than Congress intended by 
IGRA or IRA.248 The 2004 Indian Gaming Paper—an internal policy 
paper created within the Department of the Interior—found that in 
enacting IGRA, Congress did not intend for the distance of a proposed 
casino from an established reservation to be a limiting factor.249 The 
paper concluded that “[n]owhere in the IRA or its legislative history 
was there ever a discussion of mileage limits to lands that tribes could 
acquire to engage in economic enterprises.”250 Instead, off-reservation 
trust acquisitions should be encouraged under the IRA because “most 
current tribal lands will not readily support economic development” as 
intended by IRA.251 
                                                                                                                      
244 See Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 200–06; Washburn testimony, supra note 
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245 See, e.g., Skibine testimony, supra note 194 (arguing guidance memorandum is pa-
ternalistic); Washburn testimony, supra note 166 (violation of APA); Rand, Meister & 
Light, supra note 6, at 200–01 (possible violation of APA); Rand, Meister & Light, supra 
note 6, at 203–04 (minimizing positive economic impacts). 
246 See, e.g., Indian Gaming Paper, supra note 58, at 10. 
247 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A). 
248 25 C.F.R § 151.11; see Rand, Meister & Light, supra note 6, at 197–98. 
249 Indian Gaming Paper, supra note 58, at 12–13; see Jensen, supra note 6, at 694; 
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2. “Best Interest” Means More Than Employment 
 The Department’s own “Checklist for Gaming Acquisitions, Gam-
ing-Related Acquisitions, and IGRA Section 20 [§ 2719] Determinations” 
provides an informal and nonexhaustive list of criteria for determining 
whether a land acquisition is in the best interest of a tribe.252 Criteria in-
clude: “economic benefit to the tribe and its members, including the 
impact on tribal employment, job training, and career development, as 
well as benefits related to tourism, increased tribal income, and the rela-
tionship between the tribe and the surrounding community.”253 IGRA— 
designed to promote tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and 
strong tribal governments—contemplates that gaming revenues will fund 
tribal government and the general welfare of the tribe, charitable or-
ganizations, and local government agencies.254 The memorandum mis-
construes this holistic inquiry—reducing it to a question of employ-
ment—and thereby ignores IGRA’s overriding goals.255 
3. “Greater Weight” Should Include Benefits to the Surrounding 
Community 
 The denial of the Barstow proposal discounts the interests of the 
city of Barstow.256 The guidance advises that tribes provide evidence of 
“intergovernmental agreements” negotiated between the tribe and state 
and local governments.257 Unfortunately, when the Secretary denied the 
Barstow proposal, it made no reference to the town’s support, thereby 
ignoring its own guidance to consider the existence of intergovernmen-
tal agreements when applying “greater weight” to the concerns raised by 
state and local governments.258 This guidance therefore ignores the 
congressional intent of IGRA to encourage land acquisition, especially 
where state and local communities support the acquisition.259 In doing 
so, the guidance creates an obstacle to joint efforts at economic devel-
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opment and chills IGRA’s goal of cooperative federalism.260 It also ig-
nores the state’s interest in averting the environmental disaster that 
would come from having a casino at the Big Lagoon.261 Furthermore, 
the guidance rebukes the Department’s own earlier finding that where 
the local community supports an off-reservation project, successful two-
part determinations are more likely both as a legal and a practical mat-
ter.262 
4. “Commutable Distance” Misconstrues IGRA’s Intent 
 The “commutable distance” guidance creates a de facto mileage 
cap to deny off-reservation land acquisitions that are more than a 
“commutable distance” from the tribe’s reservation.263 Department of 
Interior guidelines reference “greater scrutiny” and “greater weight” as 
the distance from the reservation increases, neither the guidelines nor 
the IRA contemplate a mileage requirement.264 It is clear from its ap-
plication and from agency comments, however, that mileage informs 
agency action.265 
 On the same day the Department denied the Rancheria’s pro-
posal, it also applied the commutable distance guidance to deny ten 
trust applications of other tribes.266 Although the guidance memoran-
dum did not specify a bright-line mileage requirement, the rejected 
applications ranged from seventy to 550 miles.267 In denying these pro-
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posals, the Secretary focused primarily on the distance between the 
proposed trust acquisition and the reservation.268 The Secretary ap-
proved the trust application of the Confederated Tribes of Chehalis 
Reservation for a casino in Thurston County, Washington for a parcel 
that was located seven miles from that tribe’s reservation.269 In contrast, 
the St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin—who also enjoyed gu-
bernatorial and local support—believe their application for land 330 
miles from their reservation would have been denied if not for a pend-
ing lawsuit against the Department.270 Surprisingly, the Department 
approved the application of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, whose res-
ervation was located 609 miles from its proposed acquisition.271 
  This “ill-defined” mileage cap frustrates both IGRA—which is in-
tended to guide Secretary decisions when contemplating off-
reservation trust acquisitions for gaming purposes—and the IRA, which 
grants the Secretary the power to make land trust acquisitions for the 
benefit of Indians.272 
C. Moving Forward: Learning from the Barstow Proposal 
 In April 2008, Governor Schwarzenegger announced a deal with 
North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians to build a casino near the city of 
Fresno, forty miles from the tribe’s reservation.273 The tribe’s reserva-
tion is located south of Yosemite in an area the tribe believes is too re-
mote for a casino.274 Echoing the Barstow proposal, Tribal Chairwoman 
Elaine Bethel Fink argued that moving the proposed gaming facility also 
makes sense because it protects the Yosemite environment.275 
 Heeding the stumbling block cause by the guidance memoran-
dum, the governor indicated that he would not submit the proposal 
to the legislature until the Secretary of the Interior approves the off-
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reservation land acquisition.276 The governor and other proponents 
of the develop need to work with the Secretary to ensure that the 
proposed land acquisition is approved, even if it must do so under the 
constraints of the faulty guidance memorandum.277 The close dis-
tance between the tribal reservation and the proposed acquisition—a 
mere forty miles—is well within the distance contemplated by the 
guidance memorandum.278 Approval is not a foregone conclusion, 
though, because the governor must also overcome continued state 
legislative opposition to off-reservation Indian gaming in close prox-
imity to urban centers.279 
Conclusion 
 In negotiating the proposed compact with the Rancheria, Califor-
nia adopted novel and creative environmental provisions in an attempt 
to save the Big Lagoon ecosystem. The State also took a forward stance 
in exploring off-reservation options in an attempt to avoid environ-
mental deterioration of a fragile ecosystem. Tribes and states should be 
allowed to emulate the creativity exhibited between the city of Barstow 
and the State of California. This freedom to define the terms of tribal-
state compacts goes a long way towards improving regulatory accord 
over environmental protection, identifying and developing sites that 
minimize adverse environmental impacts, and involving local munici-
palities as willing partners. 
 To achieve this new model of compact negotiation, the Secretary 
should abandon its new guidance memorandum and solicit public 
comment to develop a new rule that achieves the intent behind the IRA 
and IGRA. This rule should enable tribes to work with local municipali-
ties to identify appropriate off-reservation sites that serve the goals of 
tribal economic development. In exchange for this deferential stance 
on off-reservation development, tribes should be more willing to allow 
states and local municipalities to seek greater environmental regulatory 
control to address the off-reservation effects of gaming. 
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